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Economists’ Perceptions versus Managers’ Decisions: 
An Experiment in Transaction Cost Analysis 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Are the perceptions of professional economists on transaction costs consistent with 
make-or-buy decisions made within firms?    The answer may have important 
implications for transaction cost research. Data on firms' outsourcing during the new 
product development process are taken from a large-scale survey of UK, German and 
Irish manufacturing plants, and we test the consistency of these outsourcing decisions 
with the predictions derived from the transaction cost perceptions of a panel of 
economists.  Little consistency is evident between actual outsourcing patterns and the 
predictions of the (Williamsonian) transactions cost model derived from the panel of 
economists. There is, however, evidence of a systematic pattern to the differences, 
suggesting that a competence or resource-based approach may be relevant to 
understanding firm outsourcing, and that firms are adopting a strategic approach to 
managing their external relationships.   
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JEL classification:  D23, L22, O31 
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1. Introduction  
 
There are now many empirical studies of transaction costs, with increasingly 
sophisticated analysis of, inter alia, the make-or-buy decision and incomplete 
contracts (see Groenewegen, 1996, and Ménard, 2000, for recent contributions).  
Much of this analysis is concerned with the process of objectively measuring 
transaction costs, or the elements believed to result in high transaction costs, such as 
asset specificity or the degree of uncertainty in a transaction.   
 
Underlying this form of analysis there is an implicit assumption that managers 
actually make the choice between in-house versus external production based on an 
objective assessment of transaction costs, or at least that they behave as if they do so. 
However, another strand of literature suggests that this search for objectivity may not 
be very productive. Buckley and Chapman (1997), for example, argue that all 
transaction costs are ultimately matters of perception.  What matters is not some 
objective measure of transaction costs in a given situation, but the perceptions of the 
relevant decision makers: 
 
‘Managerial perceptions matter, and transaction costs cannot be 
quantified or measured separately from these perceptions.  Managers 
undertake a conscious (not random) selection from among arrays of 
potential transaction costs, and among the most important transaction 
costs are those which are avoided by this process.  From the observer’s 
point of view, transaction costs are thus difficult to measure in any 
objective fashion.’ (p. 143) 
 
Buckley and Chapman refer to this notion of perceived transaction costs as ‘a rich 
tautology’, to which empirical attention ought to be directed.  In their own detailed 
research on cooperative strategies in R&D and innovation, Buckley and Chapman 
(1998) employ a social anthropology approach, and find that while transaction costs 
play an important role in shaping cooperative arrangements there is little attempt by 
managers to make any objective measurement of issues such as asset specificity or 
uncertainty. Where such issues are considered, they find that the emphasis is on 
linguistic rather than numerical expressions of transaction costs, with frequent 
reference to issues such as trust and commitment.  
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In what follows we recognise the importance of perceptions in transaction cost 
analysis, but take a quite different approach.  We ask: when economists apply 
transaction-cost reasoning, do they make decisions on outsourcing (i.e. make-or-buy) 
consistent with those made by managers?  We are therefore not testing whether firms 
make decisions based on transaction-cost economising motives, but whether the 
outcome of firms’ decision-making is consistent with transaction cost economics as 
perceived by members of the profession which developed this form of analysis.  If the 
degree of consistency between economists’ perceptions and firm behaviour is high, 
our confidence in transaction cost economics is maintained or enhanced.  If, however, 
the degree of consistency is low, then there are two possible interpretations, both of 
which have implications for mainstream empirical research on transaction cost 
economics.  First, the transaction cost ‘rules’ are wrong i.e. businesses do not use 
transaction-cost economising methods. Or, secondly, the transaction cost ‘rules’ are 
correct, but managers use them in a quite different way from those inferred by 
economists i.e. there are discrepancies either between the perceptions of economists 
and the objective reality of transaction costs, or between economists’ perceptions and 
those of the managers making actual make-or-buy decisions.  
 
It could, of course, be argued that it is of little importance if the transaction cost 
judgments of economists fail to coincide with decision making within firms; after all, 
marginal analysis was not abandoned because Hall and Hitch (1951) found that firms 
failed to equate marginal cost with marginal revenue in their pricing and output 
decisions.  It might even be regarded as unreasonable to assume that managers make 
purposeful transaction cost decisions ex ante;  following Friedman’s (1953) defence 
of the assumption of profit maximising, perhaps it matters only that firms behave as if 
they minimise transaction costs in the make-or-buy decision.  From this 
methodological perspective, the issue is not whether any individual manager makes 
explicit judgments on asset specificity or complexity before coming to a rational 
choice in any given situation, but that there exists some form of (Darwinian or other) 
selection process which allows transaction-cost minimisers to survive and prosper, 
while punishing the less proficient1.  To allow for this possibility our research differs 
                                                          
1 Buckley and Chapman (1997, pp 130-132) cast doubt on whether Darwinian selection mechanisms 
can really be applicable in corporate decision-making.  See also Hodgson (1994) for an analysis of 
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from much of the empirical transaction cost literature by focusing not on a small 
number of individual transaction made by one or a few firms, but by examining the 
outsourcing behaviour of an extensive sample of firms, sufficiently large to ensure 
that many will be ‘survivors’ in transaction cost terms even if their managers have 
failed to make purposeful transaction-cost minimising decisions.  
 
To test the consistency of firms’ outsourcing decisions and economists’ perceptions 
we make use of a panel of (mainly academic) economists who have a shared interest 
in industrial economics. The use of expert panels in transaction-cost studies is not 
new, and such panels have been used in several empirical studies (e.g. Masten et al., 
1991).  The difference here is that the views being sought are not those of the 
decision-makers themselves, nor of external ‘experts’ thought to have some objective 
insight into the scale of transaction costs, but of economists.  The perceptions of the 
panel are then compared with the actual outsourcing decisions made at around 2000 
manufacturing plants in three European countries, within the context of new product 
development.   We find that there is little consistency between the judgments of the 
panel of economists and actual outsourcing patterns, and that this remains true even 
after allowing for the effect of plant and sector-specific influences on firms’ 
outsourcing decisions.  However, the inconsistencies between the predicted and actual 
levels of outsourcing do reveal a systematic pattern, suggesting an important role for a 
competence or resource-based view.   
 
2.  Transaction Costs and Outsourcing in New Product Development 
Outsourcing in NPD 
Considerable evidence now exists of the value of utilising external resources for 
promoting new product development (NPD)2. Alongside their ability to release 
resource constraints on firms’ NPD activities, external linkages may also help in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Winter’s (1964) critique of Friedman, suggesting that, from an evolutionary perspective, the conditions 
under which the selection of profit maximisers might occur is far from obvious. 
2 For a review of earlier studies see Freeman (1991). More recent survey-based evidence comes from 
the Netherlands (Oerlemans et al., 1998), Sweden (Karlsson, 1997), Germany and France, 
(Koschatzky, 1998) and the UK (Love and Roper, 1999). Other evidence of the positive innovation 
effects of firms’ networking activities comes from firm or industry case study evidence. Gemser and 
Wijnberg (1995), for example, consider the effect of horizontal networks among companies in Silicon 
Valley and in the Italian furniture industry, while Autio (1997) provides evidence for networking 
among new technology based firms. Contrary evidence is limited, although Gauvin (1995) finds no 
evidence of positive networking effects in a study of Canadian patents data.  
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reducing risk, accelerating or upgrading the quality of the products developed, 
signalling the quality of firms’ activities (Powell, 1998) and even in increasing firms’ 
ability to appropriate the returns from undertaking NPD (Gemser and Wijnberg, 
1995).  
 
For the individual firm, however, the potential importance of these boundary-
spanning activities in NPD poses important strategic questions. Many of the issues 
involved reflect those in other forms of strategic alliances for marketing, sales or joint 
production operations (for example, the complementarity of competences, 
trustworthiness, partner quality etc.).  However, the issue is more complex for the 
NPD process due to the uncertainty implicit in R&D contracts and the resultant 
difficulties in terms of contract formulation, property rights adherence and contractual 
compliance. Some researchers argue that, by allowing firms to access resources and 
talent outside the organisation, outsourcing innovation and NPD can be a major 
strategic tool, leading to enormous savings in NPD costs and risks, and leading to 
markedly decreased product cycle times (Quinn, 2000; Rubenstein, 1994).  Others 
argue that the benefits of NPD outsourcing have been overstressed, and can be 
strategically dangerous if seen as a substitute for the development of long-term 
internal capabilities in core areas (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). 
 
The implication of this debate is that for new product development projects, 
transaction costs, broadly defined, may be a more significant element of the total cost 
bundle than in other business activities where the likely outcomes are more 
predictable and easily observed.   Ironically, however, it might be thought that 
transaction cost analysis – at least of the standard Williamsonian type – is poorly 
equipped to deal with precisely this form of activity. In part, this is because the rather 
static models of transaction cost analysis usually employed in empirical studies fail to 
reflect the uncertain outcomes and dynamic character of the NPD process3.  
 
This criticism may, however, underestimate the possible value of the transaction cost 
approach to certain specific aspects of the NPD process. While NPD as a whole may 
                                                          
3 Furthermore, decisions on outsourcing, especially in terms of NPD, may be determined not merely by 
transaction cost minimising, but also by firms’ desire to leverage the resources and competences which 
can be devoted to the project. 
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appear to be dynamic and uncertain, it is also important to acknowledge that the 
process involves a sequence of separate activities, at least some of which may be 
considered relatively routine and mundane4. Product testing for standards compliance, 
for example, has more certain outcomes and may therefore involve lower transaction 
costs than, say, prototype development, and there may therefore be less incentive for 
firms to internalise such routine activities. This suggests the potential value of 
considering NPD as a series of separate activities, each of which has a different 
technological profile, involves different risks and transaction costs and may therefore 
have a unique risk/reward balance when outsourced. When broken down in this way, 
transaction costs analysis may be useful in considering why the extent of outsourcing 
varies at each stage of the NPD process. 
 
The Transaction Cost Approach 
“TCE (Transaction Cost Economics) argues and empirically finds that 
boundary choices are driven largely by the specificity of assets involved in an 
exchange … Specific assets trigger a threat of opportunistic behaviour that 
requires costly contractual safeguards to deter. Hence, in the presence of 
exchange-specific assets, vertical integration may offer a preferred governance 
solution” (Poppo and Zenger, 1998, p. 853)5.  
 
The above quotation refers clearly to Oliver Williamson’s (1975) version of 
transaction cost analysis.  While many economists have been critical of this 
approach6, it is unquestionably the case that Williamsonian transaction cost analysis 
has become the mainstream version of the approach, and is the only version to have 
been subject to a significant amount of empirical testing in both the economics and 
strategic management literature (Shelanski and Klein, 1995).  The empirical part of 
                                                          
4 Some companies treat new product development explicitly as a routinised procedure.  For example, 
the lighting division of Philips, the electrical multinational, uses an ‘innovation manual’ to provide a 
step-by-step guide in developing new products from the initial concept to the finished marketable 
product, making the whole process as systematised as possible. 
5 It is interesting in this context that Oerlemans et al., 1998 argue that although external actors may play 
a part in innovation ‘innovation in firms is primarily internal in nature’ (p. 300). Evidence for this is 
provided by Koschatzky (1998). 
6 For example, Coase (1993: 68-71) discounts asset specificity as an important explanation for vertical 
integration, while Demsetz (1988, 1997) presents a model of vertical integration which does not rely on 
opportunism.  And Langlois (1997) argues that even where opportunism is completely absent, 
divergent views of an uncertain future may be enough to lead to joint ownership between contracting 
parties. 
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our research is therefore restricted to the Williamsonian approach with its emphasis 
on asset specificity, opportunism, and uncertainty. 
 
The NPD process involves a range of activities that differ both in their degree of asset 
specificity and in other dimensions which might shape the most efficient governance 
structure. Different types of asset specificity, i.e. physical asset specificity, human 
asset specificity, site specificity and dedicated assets may have specific consequences 
for the governance of the NPD process. For example, physical or human asset 
specificity is most evident in situations in which assets are exchange specific, so that 
investments are of little or no value in any other context. Examples would be bespoke 
machinery or equipment designed to produce some patented form of component or 
device. Or, in terms of human asset specificity, a firm may wish to access or develop 
specialist skills as part of the NPD process7. In either case, the crucial result of these 
forms of asset specificity – or more correctly Williamson’s (1975) small numbers 
problem induced by specific assets – is the possibility of hold-up. This likelihood is 
increased by the inevitable incompleteness of contracts in the NPD process that arises 
from the combination of bounded rationality, complexity and uncertainty. Fear of 
exposure to the threat of hold-up may lead to a tendency to vertical integration, or 
make, rather than buy.  
 
Also affecting the governance costs of market versus self-supply is uncertainty about 
the outcome of a potential exchange.  Where, as in the NPD process, there is a high 
degree of uncertainty over the outcome of an exchange, parties are induced to spend 
resources on ex ante and ex post contract compliance mechanisms in order to protect 
against opportunistic behaviour.  And, even where opportunism is not a threat, and the 
parties trust each other completely, intense outcome uncertainty may result in market 
failure because the parties genuinely have unbridgeably different views of appropriate 
outcomes, and therefore find it impossible to agree when satisfactory contractual 
compliance has occurred (Langlois, 1997; Love, 1995).  Such an outcome is most 
likely where the exchange revolves around the transfer of tacit or embedded 
knowledge which cannot readily be presented as plans or blueprints, precisely the 
situation which may obtain in the early stages of the NPD process. 
                                                          
7 Transaction cost economics here comes closest here to resource-based models of the firm. For 
comparisons see Langlois, 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 1998. 
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The make or buy decision is not, however, based solely on transaction costs, but will 
also take into account relative production costs: this, in turn, is related to the potential 
for external contractors to obtain economies of scale or scope. By aggregating 
demands, external suppliers may be able to achieve economies of scale unattainable to 
any individual firm engaging in self-supply. The ability to achieve economies of scale 
is also linked, however, to the degree of asset specificity. Empirical support for this 
relationship comes from Lyons’ (1995) analysis of subcontracting in UK 
manufacturing industry.  Lyons explicitly deals not merely with the trade-off between 
governance costs and production costs, but with the links between them, finding that 
specific assets tend to encourage 'make' decisions only where there are economies of 
scale, and that economies of scale (and scope) have a greater ‘buy’ effect where 
specific assets are absent. 
 
Empirical tests of the predictions of transaction cost economics typically involve 
developing measures of asset specificity and other determinants in the context of 
specific contractual conditions, and regressing these transaction cost determinants on 
some measure of make-or-buy in a reduced form estimation.  Suppose, following 
Masten et al (1991), that for any anticipated level of output the respective costs of 
firm (Cf) and market (Cm) organisation are given by: 
 
    Cf = Z + e     (1.1) 
    Cm = Y + u     (1.2) 
 
where Z and Y are (non-mutually exclusive) vectors of the determinants of cost, and 
 and  are coefficient vectors. A typical way to operationalise such a system is to 
express it as a reduced form probabilistic function using probit or logit, i.e. 
 
   Pr(Cf<Cm) = Pr (e-u<Y- Z).   (2) 
 
The key elements here are the (transaction) cost vectors Y and Z, and several studies 
go to considerable lengths to derive ‘objective’ measures of inter alia physical and 
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human asset specificity, sometimes using the judgment of expert panels8.  However, if 
the transaction cost rationale has general predictive power within the context of NPD, 
we would expect the broad pattern of outsourcing to reflect the predictions of 
transaction cost theory in a large enough sample. We therefore try a quite different 
approach towards testing, comparing the observed pattern of outsourcing found in a 
large sample of firms with the general predictions of transaction cost theory based on 
the a priori expectations of a panel of professional economists.  If the fit between the 
observed and predicted pattern of outsourcing is good, this suggests that transaction 
cost analysis – at least as understood by our panel – has some predictive power, even 
in an activity as potentially fraught with uncertainty as NPD.  If the fit is poor, this 
may suggest that firms do use transaction-cost minimising behaviour, but do not 
employ the algorithms or rhetoric of professional economists, or that transaction cost 
analysis is a poor predictor of the outsourcing decisions of firms.   
 
3.  Judgments of the Panel of Economists 
 
In the empirical analysis we identify seven activities which form part of the NPD 
process, ranging from the conceptual stage to market introduction: 
 Identification of new products 
 Prototype development 
 Final product development 
 Product testing 
 Production engineering 
 Market research 
 Developing a marketing strategy 
 
Each activity can be ranked in terms of the likely presence of asset specificity (and the 
associated threat of hold-up), in terms of the uncertainty of outcomes, and in terms of 
the likelihood of external scale economies, as outlined in the previous section.   The 
                                                          
8 In a study of the make-or-buy decision in naval shipbuilding, Masten et al (1991) make an interesting 
use of the expert panel approach.  Having obtained estimates from relevant managers of the asset 
specificity, complexity etc involved in 74 components made or bought in naval shipbuilding, these 
were then compared to estimates for the same components made by a naval architect formerly 
employed by the shipbuilder. When the correlations between the two sets of estimates were found to be 
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ranking was carried out by asking members of the Network of Industrial Economists 
for their views.  As its name suggests, the Network is “a forum for interchange among 
university economists in the UK, and for interaction between academia, business, and 
government on topics of industry economics” (www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/ INDECON).  
The Network has an electronic discussion list (INDECON) to which around half the 
network members subscribe, and through which members were sent a short 
questionnaire by e-mail (see Annex).  The purpose of the questionnaire was to elicit 
the responses of economists to the sort of questions typically asked of managers or 
expert panels in empirical transaction cost studies of the make-or-buy decision.  
Respondents were therefore asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 the levels of asset 
specificity, uncertainty and economies of scale which they would associate with each 
of the seven activities of the NPD process9.  The questions were deliberately kept 
simple and acontextual.  The respondents were not asked for their views on 
transaction cost analysis: the intention was to elicit the views of a group likely to be 
knowledgeable on mainstream transaction cost theory, not to determine their degree 
of adherence to (Williamsonian) transaction cost analysis.10  No attempt was made to 
remove outliers, as there was no clear rationale for doing so. 
 
Twenty-seven responses were received from an INDECON mailing list of 177 (15.2 
per cent).   The respondents comprised 23 academic economists, two government 
economists and two others (one academic accountant and one economist employed in 
the private sector).  The academics were split almost equally between those employed 
in economics departments and those employed in business or management schools.  
Although the network is UK based, three of the respondents came from outside the 
UK (one each from France, Spain and the United States). 
 
The mean scores given by respondents to each activity are shown in Table 111.  Asset 
specificity reflects the extent to which the human or capital assets being used or 
developed are exchange specific.  The panel expects ‘high’ asset specificity to occur 
                                                                                                                                                                      
low for several key elements (especially asset specificity), Masten et al simply drop the ‘expert’ 
opinion and use those of the managers ‘on a priori grounds’ (p. 12 fn 20). 
9 In order to keep the questionnaire as simple as possible, we tested only for the physical and human 
elements of asset specificity. 
10 Even if they are not Williamsonian adherents, the Network members are likely to know enough about 
the ‘standard’ approach to make informed estimates in the questionnaire.   
11 Using median values resulted in unchanged rankings. 
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in prototype and final product development where (especially human) assets are 
highly specific to the product under development and the firm undertaking the 
development. ‘Low’ asset specificity indicates the possibility of exchange based on 
more generic techniques and resources such as the more routine activities involved in 
market research and evaluation. Product-related activities such as production 
engineering and testing are likely to have both generic and product specific elements, 
and are regarded as an intermediate group. The level of uncertainty or unpredictability 
of outcomes is also regarded as varying markedly between the different activities, 
high for those activities which are clearly non-routine (i.e. product identification and 
prototype development), and low for the more routine activities. In these more generic 
testing, manufacture and market research activities, contractual arrangements are 
likely to be more straightforward and contract compliance (and policing) costs are 
therefore likely to be lower, making outsourcing more likely.  
 
Alongside these transaction cost issues, production cost differences will exist between 
in-house and external production, reflecting firms’ ability to generate economies of 
scale.  In the case of NPD, the potential for economies of scale are judged to be least 
evident where (human) asset specificity and uncertainty are relatively high (e.g. in 
product identification and prototyping) but also in the development of a marketing 
strategy, an activity not judged to be asset-specific or having a high degree of 
uncertainty.  By contrast, economies of scale are judged most likely to be significant 
in more generic activities such as production engineering or market research. Other 
activities such as final product development and product testing involve a more mixed 
range of generic and specific knowledge, and again form an intermediate group.  
 
In order to achieve an ex ante ranking of the likelihood of outsourcing, the scores on 
governance costs and the potential for an external (specialist) provider to achieve 
economies of scale are summed (Table 1)12.  For example, prototype development 
exhibits high (human) asset specificity and uncertainty, with low prospects for scale 
                                                          
12 For the summing process the scores for economies of scale are rescaled in reverse order to ensure 
that a low score equals a high likelihood of outsourcing, consistent with the transaction cost 
determinants. 
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economies, leading to the hypothesis that this function is, in general,13 relatively 
unlikely to be contracted out.   This is also true of new product identification, where 
the capacity for economies of scale is particularly low.  By contrast, the market 
research function exhibits the reverse characteristics, suggesting it is highly likely to 
be contracted out. Other activities fall somewhere between these two extremes.  
 
 The scores shown in Table 1 display considerable spread around the mean values, 
with coefficients of variation ranging from 0.16 to 0.50.   The rankings derived from 
the panel process are also potentially sensitive to the weighting of the three elements 
in the overall outsourcing ‘score’.  In Table 1 all elements receive equal weight.  But 
it could be argued, for example, that in an intrinsically unpredictable activity such as 
NPD, the uncertainty element should be given more weight than either asset 
specificity or economies of scale in determining the likelihood of outsourcing.  In 
practice this makes little difference: weighting uncertainty twice as heavily as the 
other two elements did not affect the ex ante rankings of the likelihood of outsourcing. 
 
4. Comparing Predictions with Actual Outsourcing Patterns 
 
Data on NPD outsourcing are taken from the Product Development Survey (PDS), a 
postal survey which provides comparable information on the new product 
development activity of 1700 UK manufacturing plants, 1300 German plants and 500 
Republic of Ireland businesses (see Roper et al., 1996; Love and Roper, 2001a)14. 
Plants responding to the PDS provided background information on the plant and 
detailed data on their product development activities during the 1991-94 period. 
Plants that had introduced either new or improved products over this period also 
responded to a question relating to whether the plant was undertaking any outsourcing 
in seven activities which form part of the NPD process15. 
 
                                                          
13 Clearly the extent to which different functions are contracted out or not will depend to some extent 
on firm and industry characteristics.  This point is developed further below, but the purpose of Table 1 
is to develop general and testable hypotheses from the transactions cost framework. 
14 This was equivalent to a response rate of 23.7 per cent in Germany, 32.0 per cent in Ireland and 20.6 
per cent in the UK (Roper et al., 1996, Table A1.1).  
15 See Roper et al. (1996) and Love and Roper (2001a) for a discussion of the factors that determine the 
probability of innovating using PDS data.  
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Table 2 summarises the proportion of innovating plants in each of the three countries 
outsourcing in each activity. Overall, a quarter to a third of plants were outsourcing 
with significant differences evident between countries for all activities excepting 
prototype development and final product development (Table 2, Part A). In the UK, 
the extent of outsourcing was typically above the average level for the sample as a 
whole, the exception being plants’ market research activity. For Germany, the 
opposite was true with below average levels of outsourcing, again with the exception 
of market research.  
 
In their analysis of Belgian innovation data, Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) find a 
significant positive link between plant size and the probability of outsourcing in the 
innovation process. In Table 2 we therefore distinguish between small plants (i.e. 
those with less than 100 employees) and larger businesses. Like Veugelers and 
Cassiman we find outsourcing to be more common among larger plants in each 
country with significant differences again evident between the proportions of plants 
outsourcing in each activity (Table 2, Parts B and C). The only exceptions relate to 
production engineering in the UK and Germany where only 1 in 6 larger UK plants 
and 1 in 12 larger German plants were outsourcing, less than their smaller 
counterparts in both cases. 
 
In terms of the overall rankings of outsourcing between activities there is little 
difference between smaller and larger plants, but rather more difference in the 
rankings between large and small plants within nations.  For example, identifying new 
products is not only more likely to be outsourced by large than small plants in 
absolute terms, but in relative terms is the second most likely activity to be outsourced 
by large plants.  By contrast, in the UK and Ireland, the most heavily outsourced 
activity for small plants is product testing, which is relatively unlikely to be 
outsourced by large plants.   Overall, there is much greater variation in the extent of 
outsourcing between countries and between large and small plants than in the relative 
rankings.  
 
A formal test of the consistency of the predicted ordering is derived by comparing the 
overall rankings of Table 2 with those derived from the economists’ panel in Table 1.  
Spearman’s rank correlation test statistics are  ρ= -0.107 for the UK, ρ= 0.321 for 
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Ireland and ρ= -0.214 for Germany: all are highly statistically insignificant, indicating 
no correlation between the predicted and actual ordered rankings. However, contrasts 
between the actual and predicted rankings are revealing.  As predicted, market 
research is the function most likely to be outsourced.  However, production 
engineering, an activity which the panel predicts to be highly likely to be outsourced, 
is consistently retained in-house by plants in all three countries.  By contrast, the 
identification of new products and prototype development – activities judged by the 
expert panel to be highly uncertain, likely to use specific human capital and unlikely 
to benefit from the existence of economies of scale, and therefore poor candidates for 
outsourcing – have in reality relatively high levels of outsourcing.  This suggests that 
while the panel was able to predict accurately the relative degree of outsourcing of 
some activities, especially those which have intermediate levels of outsourcing, other 
factors are of importance in determining the levels of outsourcing in key activities in 
the early stage of the new product development process, and in the actual 
manufacturing of new products. 
 
One possibility is that for a sample of enterprises of different nationalities, sectors and 
sizes, the ‘raw’ rankings may be heavily conditioned by plant-specific and market- 
specific factors which also affect the probability of outsourcing. To correct for this 
possibility we estimated logit models for the probability of outsourcing including 
these conditioning factors as explanatory variables. This allowed us to derive revised 
estimates of the likelihood of outsourcing purged of the influence of sector, size and 
other plant-specific determinants of outsourcing. If a ranking of these derived 
probabilities is not significantly different from the hypothesised rankings (i.e. those in 
Table 1), this provides a stronger test of the consistency of firms’ outsourcing 
decisions with transaction-cost theory as viewed by the panel of economists.   In 
addition, by including in the logit equations variables which reflect the existence of 
other outsourcing activity within the new product development process, we were able 
to derive a test of the existence of economies of scope in outsourcing as part of firms' 
NPD activities. 
 
We therefore estimated a series of logit equations of the form: 
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iiiiikij PMROO   4321)Pr(       (3) 
where Pr(Oij) is the probability that plant i outsources activity j,  Oik is the probability 
that plant i outsources other activities in the new product development process for j ≠ 
k, Ri is a vector of resource-based variables, Mi is a vector of market descriptors, and 
Pi is a vector of other plant characteristics. Parameter β1, which reflects potential 
economies of scope in the governance of outsourcing, is expected to have a positive 
coefficient. Parameters β2, β3 and β4 reflect the impact of other conditioning variables.   
 
For present purposes our concern is not with the results of the logit estimations per se, 
but with the revised rankings of outsourcing likelihood which they can provide. 
Details of the logit analysis for the UK and Germany are reported elsewhere (Love 
and Roper 2001b)16.  We use the logit estimations of equation (3) to calculate 
predictions of the percentage of plants in each country with given characteristics that 
are likely to be involved in outsourcing a given element of NPD. Table 3 therefore 
gives the predicted percentage of plants that would be outsourcing standardising on a 
set of common (i.e. mean) plant, market, and locational characteristics for each 
country, purged of the effects of the conditioning factors discussed above. The 
rankings thus derived show relatively few differences from the ‘raw’ rankings shown 
in Table 2.  Outsourcing is predicted to be most common for market research in each 
country, followed by product identification in the UK and Ireland and prototyping in 
Germany. At the other extreme, outsourcing is predicted to least common in 
production engineering in each country.  
 
There are elements of both consistency and inconsistency between the predicted 
probabilities and those suggested by the theoretical transactions cost arguments 
reflected in the perceptions of the panel. Market research, for example, a largely 
generic activity with a relatively low level of uncertainty, has the predicted high level 
of outsourcing. By contrast, production engineering has a very low predicted level of 
outsourcing despite its theoretically high outsourcing ranking in Table 1, while the 
reverse is true for new product identification and prototype development.  As with the 
‘raw’ rankings discussed earlier, a formal test of consistency is derived by comparing 
                                                          
16 Results for Ireland are available on request from the authors. Variables included in the logit 
equations included: plant specific factors (e.g. R&D, plant size, ownership, skill levels), market factors 
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the ranking of probabilities of outsourcing derived from the logit models (Table 3) 
with that predicted by the panel of economists and summarised in Table 1. Spearman 
rank correlation tests suggest ρ= -0.143 for the UK, ρ= 0.00 for Ireland and ρ= -0.107 
for Germany. As before, all these are statistically insignificant. Thus even when the 
extent of outsourcing in each phase of the product innovation process is purged of 
scale, sector, country and other potential effects, the predicted ranking derived from 
the judgment of the panel remains inconsistent with the empirical evidence.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This research has combined data from a large-scale survey of outsourcing in the new 
product development process with the insights gained from a panel in order to judge 
the consistency of transaction-cost perceptions of economists with the actual pattern 
of outsourcing exhibited by manufacturing plants.  Rankings derived from the views 
of the panel were compared with the actual patterns of outsourcing exhibited by the 
sampled plants, both in their ‘raw’ form and purged of exogenous factors influencing 
the outsourcing decision.  
 
The predicted relative likelihood of outsourcing in each activity is not consistent with 
that suggested by the panel’s perceptions of transaction cost issues. This finding 
persists after standardising for different plant and sectoral characteristics.  However, 
there is a strong positive correlation between the raw and adjusted rankings for all 
three countries,17 suggesting that the relative rankings of outsourcing reflect 
underlying strategic choices of the firms concerned, and are not simply artifacts 
induced by variations in sector, scale and other features of the sampled plants.   
 
Earlier we suggested that if the fit between the economists’ and actual rankings of 
outsourcing activity was poor, this would suggest one, or a combination, of two 
possible interpretations:  
i) transaction cost analysis is simply a poor predictor of the outsourcing 
decisions of firms; 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(e.g. market share, R&D intensity), and locational variables (e.g. population density, government R&D 
spending). 
17 Spearman rho values of 0.661 for the UK, 0.804 for Ireland, and 0.893 for Germany. 
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ii) managers do apply transaction cost analysis, but in a different way to that 
imagined by economists. 
 
Arguablyy the first of these is the more acute problem, but we first address the second 
potential explanation.  This hinges on the issue of perceptions, and in turn has two 
elements. The first implies that there is some objective measure of transaction costs, 
which the panel of economists is unable to discern accurately. By contrast, managers 
are able to make accurate judgments of these issues, and base outsourcing decisions 
on these accurate perceptions. The second element favours the Buckley and Chapman 
(1997) approach; there are indeed transaction costs ‘out there’ which are relevant to 
firm boundaries, but differences in the ways that managers judge and weigh these 
implicit costs are important. The real transaction costs here are those perceived by 
managers, and differences thus exist not between the perceptions of the expert panel 
and objective reality, but between the panel’s perceptions and those of the managers 
making outsourcing decisions. If either of these explanations is true – and assuming 
that our panel is typical of the views of professional academic economists – then there 
may be cause for concern that the perceptions of those who research into and teach 
transaction cost economics are either objectively ‘wrong’, or are at least out of step 
with the perceptions of those who make outsourcing decisions.   
 
We must be cautious, however, in claiming that the views of our panel are truly 
representative of economists as a whole, or even of those adhering to the 
Williamsonian version of transaction cost analysis.  While the panel clearly represents 
a small cross-section of (mainly) UK academic economists who have an interest in the 
area, it is impossible to be certain that a different panel might not have produced 
different views on the determinants of transaction costs and so different hypothetical 
rankings18.  The present study can claim only to be preliminary in this respect – all we 
can say with certainty is that the collective perceptions of this panel bear little relation 
to the actual outsourcing decision made at the plants in our sample.  Nor do we claim 
any knowledge of the decision-making processes of the plant managers.  Our postal 
                                                          
18 It is worth pointing out, however, that our panel included several people who have published 
extensively in the field of transaction cost economics.  It also seems likely – although we have no 
means of confirming this – that those members of the NIE who responded to the questionnaire are 
among those most likely to be sympathetic to the transaction cost approach.  The possible sample 
selection issues this raises are beyond the scope of the present study. 
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questionnaire is useful in obtaining information from a large number of plants on the 
extent and pattern of their NPD outsourcing, but is obviously not designed to discern 
the process of decision making which led to these outcomes.  All we can claim is that 
there are clear differences between these economists’ judgments and the outsourcing 
decision of firms, and this may imply some difference in perceptions between the two 
groups.  
 
This brings us to the other possible explanation for our results; that transaction cost 
analysis is, in general, ill-equipped to predict the relative level of outsourcing in the 
NPD process.  In this case even if economists and managers had identical perceptions 
of transaction costs issues, there would still be disparities between their judgments 
because the outsourcing decisions of firms are based on a different set of criteria.  
 
In considering this possibility it should be noted that the rank correlation tests 
employed above represent a very strict test for the predictions of the panel.  This is 
because the actual percentages of firms engaging in outsourcing in each phase of the 
NPD process are relatively bunched.  For example, in Table 1, while the rankings for 
all plants show a very marked difference between the highest and lowest levels of 
outsourcing (32.8% and 14.1% respectively), the activities ranked second to fifth have 
percentages of outsourcing ranging only between 22.5% and 29.2%.   Accurately 
predicting rankings within this relatively narrow range is clearly very demanding.  
This suggests that we should focus not simply on the rank correlation coefficients, but 
on the pattern of results. In this respect the differences between the panel’s rankings 
of the likelihood of outsourcing and those actually displayed by the plants reveals a 
consistent and informative pattern.  In particular, two areas stand out.  First, 
production engineering is less commonly outsourced than predicted: this is by far the 
area of activity least likely to be outsourced among all countries and sizebands19, 
despite being regarded as a strong candidate for outsourcing in transaction cost terms. 
Second, the early stages of the new product development process (identification and 
prototype development) exhibit rather more outsourcing than predicted, at least in 
ranking terms.   
 
                                                          
19 The sole exception is UK plants employing less than 100, where it ranks fourth. (Table 2) 
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It seems likely that this pattern of behaviour has more to do with the core 
competences of the plants than with transaction costs per se.  For many of these 
plants, especially the smaller ones, the production engineering and manufacturing 
parts of the business are where their basic skills and activities lie.  All plants in the 
survey were directly involved in manufacturing and for many of these plants 
production engineering and manufacturing activities are fundamental core 
competences.  While contracting out such production operations may be relatively 
simple in transaction-cost terms, it would mean eliminating a core area of activity, 
possibly resulting in a loss of key tacit skills.  By contrast, while new product 
introduction is a relatively routine activity for some plants, this is not the case for 
most; they require, or at least are happy to accept, the input of other organisations in 
the process of identifying and prototyping new products.  For many plants, therefore, 
the transaction-cost and property rights issues arising from the involvement of 
outsiders in the early stages of the new product development process are more than 
offset by the benefits obtained from engaging with experienced outsiders who bring 
unique skills.  It therefore seems likely that resource and competence-based 
explanations have a key role to play in certain aspects of the outsourcing decision. 
 
This interpretation is supported by previous research in the area.  There is evidence 
from the empirical literature that far from being simply a cost-reducing or efficiency-
enhancing policy, NPD outsourcing actually requires a significant internal effort.  To 
succeed, firms need to invest in different kinds of capabilities, those concerned with 
effectively coordinating diverse activities both internally and externally (Takeishi, 
2001).    Further, the entire focus of transaction cost analysis is on efficiency 
enhancement (i.e. transaction cost reduction) in organisational design, while the 
emphasis in many NPD outsourcing venture activities may be on other factors, such 
as the acquisition of new knowledge. In a detailed analysis of 50 supplier-
manufacturer relationships drawn from a variety of product development projects, 
Sobrero and Roberts (2001) show that there is a clear trade-off between efficiency and 
learning in such cases.  Echoing the distinction of Chesbrough and Teece (1996) 
between autonomous and systemic innovation, Sobrero and Roberts find that there are 
two potentially optimal types of  supplier-manufacturer relationships.  The first 
involves using suppliers merely as subcontractors, and assigning them specific tasks 
in parts of the project exhibiting low interdependence.  This approach is highly 
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efficient (i.e. low cost), but generates few opportunities for learning.  The second 
optimal type of relationship involves “externalizing completely the conception, design 
and realization of highly interdependent parts, and jointly working on their overall 
integration with the rest of the system” (p 508).  This involves higher coordination 
efforts and associated transaction costs, but supplies more opportunities to access tacit 
knowledge bases and so encourage learning.  The preoccupation of transaction cost 
analysis with efficiency explanations may explain why it so markedly overestimates 
the likelihood of outsourcing in production engineering where there is tacit knowledge 
to be protected, core competences to leverage and few learning possibilities for the 
manufacturers, while systematically underestimating the likelihood of outsourcing in 
the early stages of the NPD process, where the activity is still relatively independent 
from the rest of the process, and where learning opportunities are high. 
 
There is also evidence from the empirical analysis that the willingness to engage in 
outsourcing does not necessarily reflect a lack of internal resources at plant level. 
Table 2 shows that large (100+ employees) plants engage in significantly more 
outsourcing than smaller plants at every stage of the NPD process, except production 
engineering, which appears to be a special case as discussed above.  In addition, the 
logit analysis reported in Love and Roper (2001b) indicates that where a plant is a 
member of a larger group of companies, outsourcing is more common. At first sight 
both findings may appear counterintuitive.  Where a plant is relatively large or part of 
a group of plants under common ownership, it might be thought that this would 
reduce the need for extra-group linkages, because of the availability of expertise in-
house or within the group. One potential interpretation of these results is that firms are 
in effect ‘managing’ their portfolio of external relationships alongside the 
development of in-house NPD competences. The existence of such a strategic 
approach is reinforced by the strong empirical support for the existence of economies 
of scope in the management or governance of outsourcing in the new product 
development process.  The results of Love and Roper (2001b) show that plants 
engaging in outsourcing in one area of activity are significantly more likely to 
outsource other areas of the NPD process, even after allowing for market and plant-
specific influences.  
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This strongly suggests that at least part of the explanation for the lack of agreement 
between the economists’ panel and actual outsourcing behaviour lies in the limitations 
of transaction cost analysis: explanations of outsourcing in the NPD process lie 
beyond the limits of transaction cost analysis alone.  While efficiency explanations 
can provide some understanding of the pattern of outsourcing in NPD, a full 
understanding of the extent to which manufacturing plants in three different countries 
engage in outsourcing at the various stages of the NPD process requires an 
appreciation of the resource-based issues which appear to be involved in outsourcing, 
and of the willingness of firms to manage strategically their portfolios of external 
relationships with other enterprises and organisations. 
 
However, given the strong overall support for transaction cost explanations of the 
make-or-buy decision in the empirical literature, even in the context of NPD (e.g. 
Veugelers and Casiman, 1999), it seems unlikely that this is the whole story. Whether 
outsourcing decisions are governed by wholly objective analysis or by managerial 
perception, there are clearly crucial differences between the ex ante perceptions of 
professional economists and the actual NPD outsourcing decisions of UK, German 
and Irish plants.  This is turn suggests that there might be merit in pursuing research 
which examines the importance not merely of managerial perceptions in transaction 
cost analysis, but of the perceptions of the economists who carry out the analysis. The 
present study represents no more than a preliminary stage of this research programme.  
 
 
 21
 
Table 1: Transaction cost determinants and economies of scale estimates: views of 
the panel of economists  
 
 
  Transaction Cost 
Determinants 
Production 
Cost 
Determinants 
 
 Likelihood Of  External Sourcing 
 
  Asset 
Specificity 
 
Extent of 
uncertainty 
Economies of 
scale 
 
Overall score Predicted likelihood 
[Ranking] 
       
1 Identification of 
new products 
 
3.3 
(1.5) 
4.3 
(1.2) 
1.8 
(1.2) 
11.8 
(1.9) 
Low [7] 
2 Prototype 
development 
 
3.7 
(1.1) 
4.2 
(0.7) 
2.2 
(1.0) 
11.7 
(1.9) 
Low [6] 
3 Final product 
development 
 
3.8 
(0.9) 
3.5 
(0.8) 
2.4 
(1.0) 
10.8 
(1.9) 
 
Medium /Low [5] 
4 Product testing 
 
3.0 
(1.1) 
3.0 
(1.0) 
2.6 
(0.9) 
9.4 
(2.0) 
Medium [3] 
 
5 Production 
engineering 
 
3.4 
(1.2) 
2.4 
(1.1) 
3.5 
(1.1) 
8.3 
(2.3) 
High [2] 
6 Market research 
 
2.0 
(0.9) 
 
2.9 
(1.4) 
3.3 
(1.4) 
7.6 
(1.8) 
High [1] 
7 Developing 
marketing strategy 
 
2.6 
(1.3) 
3.1 
(1.4) 
2.1 
(1.1) 
9.6 
(2.3) 
Medium [4] 
 
Note 
Scores are means of 27 respondents on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high).  Standard deviations in brackets. 
The overall score is formed by a simple addition of the three elements, after the scores for economies 
of scale have been recoded in reverse order (see text).  A high score indicates a low likelihood of 
outsourcing the activity.
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Table 2: Raw percentages and rankings of plants outsourcing in NPD 
 
     
  Country Indicator  All 
 2 UK Ireland Germany  Plants 
  % % %  % 
A. All Manufacturing Plants      
Identifying new products 6.51** 27.0 (4) 30.6 (4) 26.4 (3)  26.7 (3) 
Prototype development 0.24 30.9 (2) 26.6 (5) 28.3 (2)  29.2 (2) 
Final product development 1.28 26.2 (5) 23.4 (6) 25.5 (4)  25.7 (4) 
Product Testing 44.13** 31.1 (1) 34.2 (2) 14.1 (6)  20.9 (6) 
Production Engineering 50.87** 22.1 (7) 19.3 (7) 9.8 (7)  14.1 (7) 
Market Research 8.93** 30.3 (3) 34.9 (1) 34.2 (1)  32.8 (1) 
Developing strategy 21.77** 25.6 (6) 32.3 (3) 20.4 (5)  22.5 (5) 
     
     
B. Plants  Employing less than 100        
Identifying new products 6.11** 21.2 (7) 24.4 (4) 24.0 (4)  23.2 (4) 
Prototype development 1.38 27.9 (2) 22.1 (5) 26.4 (2)  26.8 (2) 
Final product development 1.86 23.2 (5) 20.3 (6) 25.1 (3)  24.4 (3) 
Product Testing 17.11** 30.1 (1) 31.2 (1) 13.1 (6)  19.1 (6) 
Production Engineering 23.31** 24.0 (4) 16.1 (7) 10.5 (7)  14.5 (7) 
Market Research 7.09** 24.6 (3) 27.0 (2) 32.3 (1)  29.8 (1) 
Developing strategy 6.43** 21.6 (6) 25.5 (3) 19.0 (5)  19.9 (5) 
     
     
C. Plants Employing 100 or more      
Identifying new products 19.26** 42.9 (2) 57.1 (2) 35.1 (3)  38.4 (2) 
Prototype development 6.38** 36.1 (3) 48.1 (4) 35.2 (2)  35.7 (3) 
Final product development 8.94** 30.2 (6) 41.0 (6) 26.9 (4)  28.3 (5) 
Product Testing 33.31** 32.2 (5) 47.8 (5) 17.5 (6)  24.0 (6) 
Production Engineering 55.23** 15.1 (7) 37.9 (7) 7.5 (7)  10.8 (7) 
Market Research 18.84** 44.9 (1) 64.5 (1) 40.6 (1)  42.6 (1) 
Developing strategy 37.98** 34.5 (4) 56.7 (3) 25.5 (5)  29.4 (4) 
     
Notes  
1. Figures in parentheses are ranks. 
 
2. 2 tests given in table indicate the difference between Germany, the UK and Ireland in the 
proportion of plants outsourcing in each element of the new product development process. 
Asterisks  indicate a statistically significant difference at 5 per cent.  
 
3. Table relates to manufacturing plants introducing any new or improved product from 1991-94 with 
10 or more employees. Survey responses are weighted to give nationally representative results. 
Sample sizes differ between elements of new product development process due to non-response to 
some questions. Average sample sizes for parts A, B and C of the table are respectively: UK, 861, 
391 and 375; Ireland; 293, 167 and 97; Germany 840, 395, 445.  
 
Source PDS  
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Table 3: Predicted percentages and rankings of plants’ outsourcing derived from 
logit models 
 
UK Ireland Germany 
 % % % 
    
Product Identification 28.9 (2) 37.8 (2) 28.6 (3) 
Prototyping 27.8 (3) 27.0 (4) 30.1 (2) 
Final Product Development 16.9 (5) 18.1 (6) 13.6 (5) 
Product Testing 22.1 (4) 35.5 (3) 13.8 (4) 
Production Engineering 14.0 (7) 13.6 (7) 4.3 (7) 
Market Research 31.1 (1) 46.1 (1) 38.3 (1) 
Developing Marketing Strategy 16.0 (6) 26.8 (5) 13.6 (6) 
 
Notes:  Percentages are calculated using country logit equations for each activity. All calculations are made at 
variable sample means for each country. Rankings are given in parenthesis.  
 
Source:   PDS 
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Annex: Transaction Cost Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
A Small Economic Experiment 
 
We are carrying out research into outsourcing in the product innovation process, 
using a transaction cost perspective.  As part of this research we would like to carry 
out a small experiment with the help of our fellow economists.  We are keen to see 
whether it is possible to establish any consensual view (at least among industrial 
economists) as to the implications of transactions cost considerations for different 
activities involved in product innovation.  
 
To do this we need to establish some a priori benchmarks. We are therefore asking 
members of the Network to provide their views on the relative levels of asset 
specificity, uncertainty and economies of scale that they would typically expect to 
characterise seven activities that are part of the product innovation process. Our 
broad working definitions are as follows: 
 
Asset specificity – the extent to which the activity is likely to make use of specific 
physical or human assets. 
Uncertainty – the extent to which there is likely to be uncertainty regarding 
satisfactory completion of the activity. 
Economies of Scale – the extent to which there is likely to be scope for unit cost 
reductions resulting from increases in the scale at which an activity is 
undertaken. 
 
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘low’ and 5 is ‘high’, please rate the relative levels of 
asset specificity, uncertainty and economies of scale that you would typically expect 
to encounter in each of the following activities in the product innovation process: 
 
      Asset  Uncertainty      Economies 
     Specificity           of Scale 
 
1. New product identification      ___      ___      ___ 
2. Prototype development     ___      ___      ___ 
3. Final product development        ___      ___      ___ 
4. Product testing      ___      ___      ___ 
5. Production engineering     ___      ___      ___ 
6. Market research      ___      ___      ___ 
7. Developing marketing strategy    ___      ___      ___ 
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